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This paper develops a parsimonious static model for characterizing financing terms in collateralized
lending markets. We characterize the systematic risk exposures for a variety of securities and develop
a simple indifference-pricing framework to value the systematic crash risk exposure of the collateral.
We then apply Modigliani and Miller's (1958) Proposition Two (MM) to split the cost of bearing this
risk between the borrower and lender, resulting in a schedule of haircuts and financing rates. The model
produces comparative statics and time-series dynamics that are consistent with the empirical features
of repo market data, including the dramatic change in financing terms for structured products during
the credit crisis of 2007-2008.
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estafford@hbs.eduAn important service provided by nancial intermediaries in the support of capital market trans-
actions is the nancing of security purchases by investors. Investors can buy securities with margin,
whereby they contribute a portion of the purchase price and borrow the remainder from the intermedi-
ary in the form of a collateralized, non-recourse short-term loan. The risk of the loan depends crucially
on three factors: (1) the distribution of economic states; (2) the state-contingent outcomes for the col-
lateral value at loan maturity; and (3) the collateral haircut (or margin) between the market value of
collateral and the loan amount. The framework we propose isolates the systematic crash risk exposure
of dierent collateral types (equities, corporate bonds, and CDO tranches), and provides a simple mech-
anism for allocating the cost of bearing this risk between a nancing intermediary (lender) and investor
(borrower), resulting in a schedule of haircuts and nancing rates.
A typical loan is collateralized by the underlying security and protected by the borrower's capital
contribution { the collateral haircut, or margin. The haircut protects the lender from changes in the
liquidation value of the collateral. Although the liquidation value of an individual security can be aected
by myriad market frictions on a day-to-day basis, our focus is on the eect of large market declines
(crashes). This approach is motivated by the notion that the intermediaries who provide nancing
are likely to be well-diversied and have access to relatively ecient hedging strategies enabling them
to eliminate the eect of small (diusive) market moves on collateral values. As such, our framework
assumes borrowers post haircuts to immunize lenders against extreme systematic price shocks, or market
crashes. This systematic credit risk channel has not been explored in the banking literature, despite the
growing role of collateralized lending (e.g. repo market) in the economy, and the widespread interest in
ensuring collateral robustness in adverse economic states.
A pervasive feature of capital markets is that extreme price drops { measured relative to recent return
volatility { occur with some regularity. Using daily value-weighted US stock market returns from 1926
through 2009, scaled by their lagged standard deviation to construct a time series of Z-scores, we nd
that observations less than -6 occur every 5 years, on average. These are the economically signicant
events that collateral haircuts must cover in order for the intermediary to be protected from bearing
losses on its loan, and the component of the cost of capital that we investigate.
Unlike most papers in the banking and collateralized lending literature, we specialize to the case
where there are no information asymmetries, agency concerns, dierences in preferences or beliefs, or
other frictions.1 Formally, we assume that the intermediary (lender) is wholly owned by the investor
1Some prominent, early papers examining the eect of frictions include: Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Shleifer and Vishny
(1992), Holmstr om and Tirole (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist (1996, 1999), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Geanakoplos
(1997, 2003) emphasizes the endogeneity of haircuts and their sensitivity to perceptions of default. Gennaioli, et al. (2010)
present a model of nancial innovation based on biased investor beliefs.
1(borrower), such that they share the same risk preferences (CRRA utility with a constant relative risk
aversion coecient,  = 2:5). We then derive a schedule of haircuts and nancing rates { measured as
spreads above the risk-free rate { which represents the intermediary's fair charge for providing leverage.
Intuitively, the derivation is an application of Modigliani's and Miller's (1958) Proposition Two (MM) to
an investment fund that owns securities and selects leverage (capital structure). Since the borrower will
be indierent to the choice of capital structure when MM holds, the derived schedule can be thought of
as a shadow cost of leverage. We then also examine the borrower's capital structure choice, if the lender
employs an imperfect nancing rule (e.g. a credit-rating based spread), such that the cost of leverage is
mispriced.
Within our simple framework, spreads/haircuts for economic assets (e.g. equities, corporate bonds,
mortgages, etc.) are expected to co-move with one another and proxies for aggregate risk in the time
series. A key determinant of the nancing terms extended by the lender is the rate at which the value of
the collateral declines at the point where the borrower haircut has been wiped out. Securities which have
quickly declining recovery values, are expected to: (a) be nanced at higher spreads/haircuts; and, (b)
respond much more strongly to changes in state variables describing the state of the economy (market
volatility). We nd that with typical haircuts (e.g. Reg T, H = 0:50) nancing spreads on equities are
robustly stable across a range of equity market volatilities. Similarly, our empirical calibration shows that
spreads on highly-rated (AA-AAA) corporate bonds remain relatively unchanged, even when haircuts
are low (H < 10%). This contrasts meaningfully with the properties of many structured securities.
As documented by Coval, Jurek, and Staord (2009a,b), structured securities can have dramatically
dierent systematic risk proles (e.g. state-contingent payos) than similarly-rated corporate bonds. In
particular, the process of tranching can create assets whose values decline rapidly as market conditions
deteriorate. As a result, we should expect spreads/haircuts for many types of structured securities to
increase much more than for similarly-rated corporate bonds in times of market stress. These predictions
broadly parallel the empirical ndings of Gorton and Metrick (2009) who examine repo market data
from 2007 and 2008. For example, consider the [7;10] tranche referencing the Dow Jones CDX index
of investment grade debt (CDX.NA.IG), which was considered by market participants to be a roughly
AAA-rated asset. Our model indicates that this security cannot be used as collateral if we require that
the nancing spread remain equal to 250 basis points (or less), as market volatilities range between
10-50%. Indeed, Gorton and Metrick (2009) report that during 2008, spreads on this type of collateral
averaged 233 basis points with an average haircut of 50%; and { at the peak of the crisis { structured
collateral could not be repo-ed at all. Consequently, the extreme change in spreads and haircuts in the
2collateralized lending markets is not surprising, when viewed from the perspective of the rapid rise in
realized (and implied) equity volatilities.
The framework can also be used to stress test dierent types of collateral by examining the predicted
nancing terms as market conditions change. This exercise allows us to isolate two crucial features of
the structured nance securities that contributed to their instability, when used as collateral. First,
tranche thinness leads to signicant volatility in nancing terms, even if tranches are backed by high-
quality collateral, such as investment grade bonds. Thick tranches (e.g. [7;100]) backed by high-quality
collateral inherit much of the stability exhibited by standard corporate bonds. Second, due to the rapid
decline in the value of subprime mortgages as economic conditions deteriorate, they represent \poor"
collateral. Super senior claims of re-securitizations of sub-prime mortgage RMBS inherit these features,
and likewise, will behave poorly when used as repo collateral.
Finally, the framework is helpful for evaluating the notion that many securitizations experienced
an increased \information sensitivity" throughout the 2007-2008 credit crisis, leading to concerns over
adverse selection and a panicked \run on repo" (Holmstr om (2008), Gorton and Metrick (2009), Dang,
Holmstr om, and Gorton (2010)). This view is largely based on analyses that do not allow for a meaningful
systematic risk channel and therefore attribute the entirety of the observed price adjustments to market
failure. In contrast, our analysis suggests that the role for state-contingent adverse selection is limited
and likely to be diminishing relative to systematic risk exposures as price adjustments become large.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a simple framework for valuing the risk of
market failure; section 2 empirically characterizes the crash distribution; section 3 describes the cost of
capital for specic asset classes; section 4 discusses the implications of the model; and section 5 concludes.
1 Valuing the Risk of Market Failure
In practice many transactions in capital markets bundle the purchase of an asset with the provision
of credit. The implicit loan is collateralized by a combination of the (risky) asset being purchased and
riskless collateral provided by the purchasing party, known as the haircut. In this arrangement, the lender
eectively provides nancing for the dierence between the purchase price and the haircut, for which he
receives a fee, paid in the form of an interest rate (or spread above the riskless interest rate). The haircut
posted by the borrower represents his equity in the transaction. Formally, the parties to the arrangement
can bargain over the terms of the loan { duration, haircut and spread { resulting in a schedule of funding
3arrangements, which eectively split the risk between the two parties to the transaction.2
To create a meaningful role for risk-sharing, we assume that the security is exposed to jumps in
the level of the aggregate equity market index. We interpret these jumps as representing the risk of
market failure. From here, to derive the schedule of funding arrangements we need three ingredients:
(1) a function describing the consequence of the market failure for the value of the asset, B(); (2) the
frequency, P, and cumulative distribution function, FP(), of market failures; and (3) a utility function,
U(), to analyze the pricing of the underlying risks in the presence of various risk-sharing arrangements.
The superscripts, P (Q), denote quantities under the objective (risk-neutral) measure.
1.1 The Model
We introduce the valuation methodology in a simple setting with no nancial intermediary. This
valuation exercise simply assigns a dollar value to an insurance contract that insures the investor's wealth
from the consequences of an ~ x percent jump in the market index. We denote the pre-jump wealth by
Wt  and the post-jump wealth by Wt(~ x), which will generally depend on the consequence function, B(~ x),
describing how the asset is exposed to the crash. To value the jump insurance, suppose there is a claim
which pays I(~ x) in the event of a jump with a price of . If the agent buys  units of the claim his








= (1   P)  U (Wt    q  ) + P 
Z 1
0
U (Wt(x) + q  I(x)   q  )  fP(x)  dx (1)
where P is the probability of observing a market failure over some (short) discrete interval of time. At
the optimum the partial derivative of the expected utility with respect to q, evaluated at q = 0, has to
equal zero.3 This yields the price of insurance:
 = P 
R 1
0 U0 (Wt(x))  I(x)  fP(x)  dx
(1   P)  U0 (Wt ) + P 
R 1
0 U0 (Wt(x))  fP(x)  dx
(2)
2Geanakoplos (2003, 2010) examines equilibrium selection along this nancing schedule in a setting where agents have
heterogeneous beliefs.
3Bakshi, Madan, Zhang (2006) and Bates (2008) use an indierence pricing methodology to value jump risk in credit
default swaps and equity index options, respectively.
4The price of jump insurance can also be re-written in terms of the corresponding risk-neutral quantities:
Q = P 
R 1
0 U0 (Wt(x))  fP(x)  dx
(1   P)  U0 (Wt ) + P 
R 1
0 U0 (Wt(x))  fP(x)  dx
(3)
fQ(x) =
U0 (Wt(x))  fP(x)
R 1
0 U0 (Wt(x))  fP(x)  dx
(4)
In the case were the loss conditional on a jump is equal to zero, x = 0, the risk-neutral and objective
jump probabilities are identical. Using the above expressions, the price of the jump insurance is simply
the expected value of its payo evaluated under the risk-neutral measure:
 = Q 
Z 1
0
fQ(x)  I(x)  dx (5)
In the presence of an intermediary, who facilitates the provision of leverage { by allowing the investor
to borrow funds to nance the purchase of the risky asset { the risk of market failure will be shared
between the two parties. The cost of capital to both parties is pinned down from the second proposition
of Modigliani and Miller, or equivalently, by valuing the cost of insuring each party against the risk of
loss. The consequence of a market failure to the borrower is described by a security-specic function,
B(x), which represents a transformation on the loss, x, resulting from the market failure (e.g. the change
in the value of a hedged option portfolio, corporate bond, etc.). If we assume that the risky asset was
purchased using nancing obtained from a nancial intermediary, the borrower's equity exposure will
be limited by the magnitude of the haircut, H. Specically, the state-contingent loss function for the
borrower is given by:




B(x) x < ^ x
H x  ^ x
(6)
where ^ x = B 1(H). In other words, ^ x is the minimal equity index jump necessary to wipe out the
borrower's equity capital, H, in the trade, and expose the lender to a loss. We will generally normalize
the consequence function and haircuts, such that they correspond to a $1 position in the risky security.
Consequently, the borrower's leverage { or ratio of assets to equity { is given by H 1. To derive the
cost of capital for the borrower and the lender, we value the cost of insuring each party against the
losses stemming from a market failure. By MM, the sum of these dollar costs equals the cost of insuring
the unlevered strategy, (5). Therefore, the lender's charge can be simply obtained by dierencing the
5borrower's cost of capital from (5):
b = Q 
Z 1
0





1   FQ(^ x)

+ EQ [B(x)j x < ^ x]  FQ(^ x)

(7)
l =    b = Q 





1   FQ(^ x)

(8)
The dollar lender fee is given by the product of three terms: the probability of observing a market failure
(Q), the likelihood that the haircut will be exhausted in the event of the market failure,
 
1   FQ(^ x)

,
and the expected loss to the lender as a result of the haircut being exhausted, EQ [B(x)j x > ^ x] H. The
nal term is bounded between zero (no credit risk) and 1 H, where the asset loses all value conditional
on the jump, x, exceeding the threshold ^ x. The latter situation describes a levered position in a binary
option (or digital tranche), where { if the index jump x causes the option to fall out-of-the-money at the
expiration date { the borrower's capital H is wiped out, and the lender bears the remainder of the loss,
1   H.













Holding risk preferences and crash distributions constant, the largest interest rate is obtained when the
third term is equal to unity. In this scenario, the lender's charge { expressed as a continuous-time ow
rate { is given by Q 
 
1   FQ(^ x)

 dt, where Q is the annualized risk-neutral market failure arrival
intensity. This case corresponds to nancing a security that becomes worthless following a market crash
x > ^ x.
To gain further intuition regarding the lender's fee { or, equivalently, the nancing rate { we can
approximate the consequence function, B(x), around the critical value, ^ x, at which the borrower's haircut
is wiped out. Assuming the consequence function is dierentiable we have:
l  Q 










 EQ [(x   ^ x)j x > ^ x] (10)
where we have made use of the fact that ^ x = B 1(H). The above approximation can also be rewritten
as:








(x   ^ x)
+
(11)
6This formula conveys the intuition that the lender's exposure is captured by the likelihood of a systematic
crash, Q, and his exposure to this crash. The exposure can be further represented as a portfolio of
call options on losses on the aggregate equity index, struck at the critical value, ^ x, at which the haircut
is wiped out (third term). The \quantity" of these options is measured by the slope of the crash
consequence function, B(x), around the critical index return (second term). If the consequence function
is steep around the critical point, the lender anticipates market failures to precipitate larger losses,
resulting in commensurately higher nancing rates for any given haircut level, H. As we show later,
securities such as traditional corporate bonds and structured nance securities can have signicantly
dierent consequence function slopes around the critical point, B0(^ x), even though they share identical
credit ratings. This dierence turns out to be a key ingredient in explaining the dierences in the
dynamics of nancing rates (and haircuts) observed for various collateral types during the credit crisis
of 2007-2008.
1.2 A convenient parametrization
In order to gain greater transparency and facilitate empirical implementation, it will be convenient
to specialize the formulas derived in the previous section to a particular case of the utility function,
U(), and crash distribution, FP(). Specically, we will assume that the agent has CRRA utility with
relative risk aversion, , and the distribution of crashes on the market index sustained as a result of
market failure has a beta distribution with parameters (a; b). Moreover, since we have assumed that
the investor (borrower) owns the intermediary (lender) and there are no market frictions, we can carry
out valuation as if in a representative agent setting, with the agent's wealth being wholly invested in
the aggregate wealth portfolio. With this setup, the representative agent's wealth following a market
failure (jump), Wt(x), is given by Wt  (1 x). The resulting risk-neutral jump probability, Q, can be




Q = P 
R 1
0 (1   x)   fP(x;a;b)  dx
(1   P) + P 
R 1








Conveniently, we can also show that the risk-neutral distribution of market failures is likewise a beta
distribution but with shifted parameters, (a;b   ):
fQ(x) =
(1   x)   fP(x;a;b)  dx
R 1
0 (1   x)   fP(x;a;b)  dx
=
 (a + b   )
 (a)   (b   )
 xa 1  (1   x)b  1  dx (13)
7As a result, the mean loss in aggregate wealth resulting from the market failure can be evaluated in






a + b   
(14)
The price of an insurance claim that completely hedges the jump risk, I(x) = x { expressed per unit
of wealth, Wt , exposed to the jump { is given by:
 = Q 
Z 1
0
fQ(x)  x  dx = Q 
a
a + b   
(15)
A risk-averse representative agent would therefore be willing to give up a fraction, Q Q, of his wealth
to hedge the exposure to market failure risk. On the other hand, if the agent were risk-neutral the price
of jump insurance would be equal to a fraction P  P of total wealth, i.e. equal to the unconditional
expected loss due to market failures. The approximation of the lender's fee, (11), can also be further
elaborated to yield:












1   FQ(^ x;a + 1;b)

  ^ x 

1   FQ(^ x;a;b)

(16)
2 Characterizing the Crash Distribution
The framework is based on a frictionless capital market with the exception of the crashes. In these
episodes, the market is not functioning as it normally does. The primitive feature of such an event is
that it meaningfully interferes with the market participants' ability to dynamically eliminate their net
systematic exposure. We empirically investigate these situations from two basic perspectives. First, we
suppose that the market structure is highly robust, but information can be released overnight. While
the market is closed overnight, prices are unable to smoothly incorporate information, which creates the
possibility of a discrete move in each overnight period. This creates a type of discretization studied by
Bertsimas, Kogan, and Lo (2000, 2001) that manifests itself in hedging errors. The borrower is required
to post collateral against these hedging errors.
Second, we suppose that the market is typically robust, but that it can occasionally fail. In this
view, market failures are rare, but can be associated with large market declines.4. These are signicant
4This is distinct from the \rare economic disasters" perspective of (Rietz (1988), Barro (2006, 2009)). These occur
on a considerably longer time scale than the 1-day or overnight crashes considered above, but are important in that they
signicantly reduce aggregate wealth and therefore risk bearing capacity for outstanding securities. In some sense, this is
what the nancial system has to survive even if the individual agents do not view this to be their own problem. Barro
(2006) estimates that the probability of these rare economic disasters is around 2% per year with a GDP contraction of
8events because dynamic hedging strategies can be highly compromised in these situations, leading to
ruinous losses. For example, on October 19, 1987, the US value-weighted stock market index declined
17%, following a 10% decline the previous week. Many have argued that liquidity disappeared over
this period (for example, Amihud, Mendelson, and Wood (1990)), suggesting that intraday hedging was
severely impaired during this event.
To empirically identify crashes from the daily data we employ a simple threshold rule based on Z-
scores. In particular, we calculate Z-scores by scaling each return by the standard deviation of lagged
returns, in order to eliminate the eects of stochastic volatility. We then use a threshold of -6 to classify
daily returns associated with a Z-score below this threshold as crashes (A t-Sahalia (2004) motivates this
cuto rule). The idea behind using Z-scores to identify extreme events is twofold. First, this measure
captures the idea of the crash being highly unusual relative to what was expected going into the situation.
In other words, a 5% daily return is highly surprising following 3 months of 0.5% daily volatility, but not
if recent daily volatility has been 3%. Second, to the extent that this measure is stable through time,
it represents a practical method for producing a conditional forecast of the crash distribution, since the
only input is current volatility, t.
As noted in the previous section, we rely on the beta distribution for analytical convenience.5 The
following procedure is used to estimate a conditional crash return distribution. First, we assume that
the empirical Z-score distribution, g(Z), is stable across time. Second, we convert the empirical Z-
score distribution to a conditional crash return distribution by computing the corresponding losses as,
x = 1 exp(t  Z). Finally, we t a beta distribution to the conditional crash return distribution, placing
particular emphasis on matching the tails. Specically, we assume that the largest observed Z-score cor-
responds to the p-th percentile of the population crash distribution and then select the beta distribution
parameters that minimize the squared deviations between the empirical and analytical distributions at
the median and the p-th percentile. This tting procedure mitigates the potential of standard moment-
matching methods to underestimate the true risk of severe events, due to the historically favorable
in-sample experience of U.S. equities (\peso problem").
In order to assign a population percentile, p, to the largest observed Z-score, we draw on extreme
value theory. According to this theory, conditional on being in the tail of a distribution, returns obey a
generalized Pareto law { a prediction which has considerable empirical support in U.S. equity return data
15% to 60%
5Our results are robust to an alternative approach in which we t a gamma distribution to the Z-scores, and subsequently
scale it by the prevailing volatility, t, to obtain the relevant log return distribution. In fact, it is possible to show that if
crash returns are beta distributed, the corresponding Z-scores will approximately follow a gamma distribution for modest
return realizations.
9(Gabaix (2009)). Using maximum likelihood we t the parameters of the generalized Pareto distribution
to the extreme Z-scores and then invert a likelihood ratio test to obtain the joint condence interval
for the parameter estimates. This also yields the corresponding condence interval for the population
percentile, p, of the largest Z-score observed in our sample. For example, in daily data the most severe
event corresponds to a Z-score of -15.5, and the estimated 95% condence interval for p ranges from
79% to 100%. Since lower percentile values imply the population distribution assigns signicantly more
weight to events even more extreme than the worse event observed the dataset, we conservatively assign
the largest Z-score observed in-sample to the 95th percentile of the tted distribution.
2.1 Overnight Returns for the S&P 500 Index
The return data are based on high frequency (5-minute intervals) price observations on the S&P 500
Index from 1983 through 2009 (5,300 overnight observations) obtained from TickData. We dene the
overnight return for day t as the dierence between the log opening price on day t and the log closing
price on day t   1. Weekend returns are identied as those having more than one calendar day between
the opening price and the previous closing price. Prior to 2008, the minimum overnight return is -2.4%
and since then it is -5.9%. This already suggests that the contribution of this phenomenon to observed
lender nancing rates is likely to be small since the lender is unlikely to sustain a loss from crashes of
these magnitudes.
The overnight Z-scores are calculated by scaling the overnight return by volatility. Volatility is
calculated from the previous 390 intraday returns (5 trading days) and scaled in two ways to account
for the time elapsed overnight. The rst scaling is by the square root of the elapsed calendar time in
the overnight period. The second scaling accounts for the elapsed eective time in the overnight period.
Consistent with previous research, we nd that the elapsed eective time overnight is considerably
less than the elapsed calendar time (see French and Roll (1986), Amihud and Mendelson (1987), and
Lockwood and Linn (1990)). We nd that, on average, roughly 30% of a trading day's return volatility
is realized in the overnight return, while accounting for 73% of the elapsed calendar time. Despite
the additional calendar time inherent in weekends, we nd that these periods contribute no more than
ordinary overnight periods to realized return volatility, on average. In our analysis we assume that the
eective time in overnight and weekend period is equal to 150 minutes, such that the equivalent of 540
minutes of trading time elapses in a trading day (time between consecutive market closings). There
are no overnight returns associated with a Z-score below -6 using either scaling rule, indicating that no
overnight crashes have been realized in the S&P 500 Index since 1983.
102.2 Daily Returns on the Value-Weighted Market Index
The daily return data come from CRSP and are based on the value-weighted index of US stocks from
1926 through 2010 (22,527 observations). We scale each daily return by the standard deviation of the
past 63 returns (3 months) to calculate a Z-score. Again, we then use a threshold of six to classify daily
returns associated with a Z-score below this threshold as crashes.
Figure 1 displays the time series of daily returns, volatility, and Z-scores. October 19, 1987, was only
1 of 19 days where the realized daily loss on the stock market was associated with a Z-score below -6. Six
of these events have occurred in the last third of the sample period, including the most severe, consistent
with the notion that the empirical \crash" distribution is reasonably stable and not much altered in
the modern era. This empirical crash distribution implies an annual crash probability of nearly 20%
(1 (1 p)252 = 19:15%; where p = 0:0009 = 19
22527); the corresponding annualized crash intensity equals
P = 0:2126.
The calibration, where matching the tails is given high priority, takes as inputs the empirical Z-score
distribution and the prevailing volatility. Table 1 reports the calibrated beta distribution parameters for
a range of index volatilities, set on the basis of the percentiles of the CBOX VIX index time series. By
construction, log crash returns scale linearly with the prevailing volatility in our framework. This feature
is typical of many jump-diusion option pricing models used in the equity option literature (e.g. Bates
(2000), Pan (2002)). As a result, the standard deviation of crash losses, x, grows roughly linearly with
volatility, such that the jump share of variance is essentially constant. For moderate levels of volatility,
the 95th percentile crash size { conditional on volatility { is approximately equal to the current level of
annualized volatility. Figure 2 displays the calibrated daily crash return distribution at an annualized
volatility of 15%, which we will take as our baseline in many of the analyses that follow, as well as at
35%. For comparison, the bottom panel also displays the crash distributions obtained by applying a
standard maximum likelihood tting procedure.
2.3 Implications for aggregate quantities
The presence of a jump component in the return dynamics in the aggregate equity index, inuences
the total equity volatility and risk premium. The contribution of the shock to the instantaneous index
return variance { which is comprised of the diusive return variance (2
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a  (a + 1)
(a + b + 1)  (a + b)
 P  dt (17)
As argued in the previous section, the parameters of the beta distribution, (a; b), will generally themselves
be time-varying and depend on the level of the diusive volatility, t. A noted earlier, the contribution of
discontinuous moves to total (instantaneous) quadratic variation { measured as a ratio of jump variance
to total quadratic variation { is roughly constant in our model (Table 1). With a diusive volatility of
15% (35%) the total index volatility is roughly equal to 15.44% (35.89%).
In a jump-diusion setting the total equity risk premium will be comprised of compensation for
diusive risk, and a premium for jump risk. In a standard CAPM setting the compensation for diusive
risk is equal to   2
t. However, since our setting focuses explicitly on jump risk, this component of the
risk premium plays no role in the paper's results. The contribution of jumps to the equity risk premium
is measured by the dierence in the expected excess return to bearing jump risk, and is given by:
rp = Q 
a
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 P  dt (18)
For example, with a risk aversion, , of 2.5, and a baseline volatility of 15%, the diusive risk premium
would be equal to 5.62% per year, with jump risk contributing an additional 41 basis points. Unlike
the share of jumps in total variance, the contribution of the jump risk premium in the total equity risk
premium is increasing in the level of diusive volatility (unreported results).
3 The Crash Risk Cost of Capital for Various Securities
This section uses the model derived in Section 1 to investigate nancing arrangements { haircut and
spread pairs { for equities and xed income securities (corporate bonds and structured nance assets). A
key ingredient in this analysis are the crash consequence functions, B(x), of these assets. These functions
describe the change in the value of the asset in response to a market decline of magnitude, x. In general,
the change in the value of the asset depends on the crash magnitude through two channels: (a) its eects
on the state-contingent payo function; and, (2) its eect on state variables that aect state prices. In
our case, the the state variables are the equity market volatility, m(x), the the aggregate risk aversion
(which will be held constant throughout). Therefore, a generic crash consequence function will have the
12form:
B(x) = V (t; x; m(x); )   V
 
t ; x = 0; m(x = 0); 

(19)
In the case of equities, which we use to introduce the framework, we will specify the crash consequence
function directly using a market model. In the case of xed income securities, which constitute the bulk
of the assets used in repo markets, we construct the crash consequence functions by separately describing
the asset-specic payo functions and state prices. This allows us to investigate in greater detail, which
state-contingent payo proles are likely to enhance collateral stability, which we dene as low volatility
in spread-haircut pairs over the range of state variables. Finally, we illustrate how the use of simple
rules of thumb { e.g. based on credit ratings { can lead to situations where securities are nanced at
incorrect spreads/haircuts, creating a motive for borrowers to hold mispriced assets.
Our focus is exclusively on the robustness of the asset value to rare, but generally large, market
crashes, which we identify using the procedure in Section 2. In this setting, collateral haircuts are
applied by lenders in order to mitigate their exposure to aggregate crash risk. This contrasts with
approaches that examine collateral in the context of daily mark-to-market volatility, or liquidity risk.
Given the central role of collateralized lending in capital markets, ensuring their robustness in time of
severe market stress is likely to be of interest to regulatory agencies.
3.1 Equity
Investing in individual equities on margin represents a prototypical strategy involving lender nancing
and exposure to aggregate equity risk. We describe each stock using its beta to the aggregate index, ,
which is assumed to apply identically to diusive and jump shocks. The consequence function for a $1
investment in the equity, B(x), is given by:
B(x) = expf  ln(1   x)g   1 = (1   x)   1 (20)
This specication preserves the limited liability of the investment in the individual security, and ensures
that a zero percent index return is equal to a zero percent return on the individual security. Moreover,
when  = 1 the equity consequence function is equal to  x, i.e. the index loss. The cost of insuring
losses on this strategy, I(x) =  B(x), is given by:
 = Q 

1  
 (a + b   )   (b +    )
 (b   )   (a + b +    )

(21)
13Now suppose the investor establishes a levered position in the equity by posting collateral, H, and
borrowing the balance of the $1 purchase price from an intermediary. Given the collateral choice, H,
the critical index return at which losses on the levered equity position exceed the collateral is:
^ x = 1   (1   H)
1
 (22)
The comparative statics for ^ x are illustrated in Figure 3. Panel A shows the critical crash size that
exhausts the borrower's capital as a function of the underlying equity beta for three dierent margin
rules. Reg T margin requires a collateral haircut of 50% to initiate an equity position. Portfolio margin
requires a collateral haircut of 25% for individual equities and 10% for a broad highly capitalized equity
index. For an individual equity with a market beta of 1, a lender extending leverage under portfolio
margin is completely protected against crashes until the crash size exceeds 25%. Empirically, market
betas for individual equities are rarely reliably larger than 2. For a stock with a market beta of 2, the
lender is crash protected until the crash size exceeds 13.4%. Panel B shows how ^ x varies as a function
of the collateral haircut for three equities with dierent market betas. When market beta is 1, there is
a one-for-one tradeo between collateral and crash protection for the lender. The lender is protected
against larger (smaller) crashes when the stock's market beta is less (larger) than 1.
The cost of insuring the levered investment can be obtained by applying (7):
b = Q 

FQ(^ x;a;b   )  
 (a + b   )   (b +    )
 (b   )   (a + b +    )
 FQ (^ x;a;b +    ) +
+H 

1   FQ (^ x;a;b   )

(23)
The (up-front) fee paid by the borrower to the lender for providing nancing can then be obtained as
the dierence between the cost of insuring the unlevered strategy and the cost of insuring the losses on
the levered investment, l =    b. This quantity is typically quoted in term of an interest rate (or
spread), which can be obtained by expressing l as a fraction of the loan amount, 1   H.
In order to derive the cost of capital for the borrower and lender, we rst need to compute the dollar
loss each party expects to sustain as a result of market failure. These quantities can be obtained by
using the formulas above, but setting  = 0, since a risk-neutral agent would simply charge the expected
14loss:
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(25)










Note that { unlike the interest rate (or spread) on the margin loan { the lender's cost of capital is
adjusted for losses sustained due to insucient collateral coverage. In other words, the lender must
charge a spread that grosses up the cost of capital to cover expected losses.
We now use this framework to investigate the properties of the crash component of the cost of capital
for equities. Figure 4 shows the crash component of the cost of capital for equities with various market
betas and demonstrates how the portfolio margin rule (H = 25%) adjusts the cost of capital for the
lender and the borrower. For a stock with a market beta of 1, the security-level (unlevered) cost of
capital is 39 bps and increases nearly linearly with market beta, reaching 73 bps for a stock with market
beta of 2. With this relatively high collateral haircut, the borrower bears the majority of the crash
exposure until market beta gets very high, and consequently has a relatively high cost of capital. The
borrower's cost of capital is 154 bps for a stock with a market beta of 1 and 281 bps for a stock with
a market beta of 2. The lender's margin loan is nearly riskfree over the empirical range of stock betas
(0-2), producing lender costs of capital of less than 1 bp for stocks with a market beta of 1 and of only
4 bps for stocks with a market beta of 2. As the market beta increases above 3, the lender bears more
of the crash risk so the borrower's cost of capital increases slowly with beta above 3, while the lender's
cost of capital increases more quickly.
Panel B of Figure 4 decomposes the lender's cost of capital into an expected loss rate and a nancing
spread charged on the margin loan. The idea is that to earn the cost of capital, the lender must charge
an interest rate that covers the expected losses. The plot makes clear that over the empirical range
of market betas, the lender's margin loan is nearly riskfree, but that if a very high beta security was
available the loan would become quite risky.
In practice, it is unusual for a lender to charge interest rates for margin loans against stocks as a
function of market beta. Rather, a single margin loan interest rate applies to all stocks, subject to a
minimum collateral haircut. We can easily investigate how such a rule of thumb distorts the borrower's
15expected return. Panel C of Figure 4 describes the borrower's expected return in the situation where the
lender uses a rule of thumb to set the interest rate on the margin loan. Rather than properly applying
the schedule of interest rates based market beta, the lender charges a single interest rate of 25 bps for
all stocks. The eect of the constant interest rate on margin loans against stocks with dierent market
betas reduces the borrower's expected return on low beta stocks and increases it on high beta stocks.
Interestingly, over the empirical range of market betas this rule of thumb is not very distortive. However,
if one was to nd a very high beta stock, such a rule of thumb would provide a large nancing benet
to the borrower.
The collateral haircut governs how the cost of capital is adjusted for the lender and the borrower.
Panel A of Figure 5 shows the proper schedule of lender nancing rates for stocks with various market
betas as a function of the collateral haircut. As demonstrated earlier, with a haircut of 25% margin loans
are nearly riskfree for stocks with market betas that are not too large. At this collateral level interest
rate spreads are under 50 bps even for stocks with a market beta of 2 and under 1 bp for stocks with
market beta of 1 and below. As collateral haircuts fall from this level, proper interest rates begin to
increase, more rapidly the higher the market beta. This suggests that a borrower facing a lender relying
on a rule of thumb margin loan interest rate will have a powerful incentive to negotiate slightly lower
collateral haircuts, especially for high beta securities. Panel B of Figure 5 demonstrates this eect by
plotting the borrower's nancing alpha (dierence between the expected return under the lender's rule
of thumb interest rate of 25 bps and the proper cost of capital) as a function of collateral. A very small
reduction in the collateral haircut creates a huge nancing benet for the borrower when holding high
market beta securities.
Finally, we examine the eect of changes in volatility. All of the analyses so far have relied on market
volatility of 15%. As volatility changes, the crash distribution is altered. While the crash frequency
is assumed to be constant, higher volatility increases the crash size since we assume that crashes are
constant in Z-scores. We construct a proper schedule of margin loan interest rates as a function of
volatility, holding collateral haircuts constant (Panel A of Figure 6). With Reg T haircuts, the margin
loans remain quite safe for the lender as annualized daily volatility increases to 50%. With lower collateral
haircuts the proper margin loan interest rates climb signicantly with volatility. We also calculate the
schedule of proper required haircuts, holding margin loan interest rates constant (Panel B of Figure 6).
This highlights the dependence of the interest rate/collateral haircut pair on volatility and may partially
explain why interest rates and haircuts increased across the board throughout 2008.
163.2 Corporate bonds and structured collateral
In this section we consider the cost of nancing the purchase of corporate bonds and corporate asset-
backed CDO tranches. In order to characterize the crash consequence functions, B(x), for these two
collateral types we require a valuation model that allows us to describe security values as a function of
the crash size, x. To do this we use a modied version of Merton's (1974) structural model of credit,
which includes a common, market factor driving asset returns of various rms, introduced in Coval,
Jurek, and Staord (2009a). This framework will allow us to compute the state-contingent payos for
bonds, bond indices, and CDO tranches, P(m;x), as a function of the level of the market index at
maturity, m, before and after a crash of size, x. To complete valuation we also require a set of Arrow-
Debreu prices (Arrow (1964), Debreu (1959)) in the pre- and post-crash states, A(m;x), against which
the state-contingent payos will be integrated. The crash consequence function, B(x), is then simply the
change in the asset value resulting from a market crash, x:
B(x) =
Z
Pi(m;x)  A(m;x)  dm  
Z
Pi(m;x = 0)  A(m;x = 0)  dm (27)
3.2.1 State prices
Coval, Jurek, and Staord (2009a) compute a new set of state-prices for each day in their sample by
tting implied volatilities on ve-year equity index options. Their approach produces an expression that
adjusts the standard formula for Arrow-Debreu state prices (Breeden and Litzenberger (1978)) for the
existence of a implied volatility skew. Because our focus here is not a time-series analysis of the pricing
of structured products we will simplify the computation of Arrow-Debreu prices by using the formula of
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978). Given a market volatility, m(x = 0), state-prices corresponding to
















and d2 = d1   m(x) 
p
 (29)
To simplify notation, we have also dened the log moneyness, m, as the natural logarithm of the ratio
of the terminal market index level, MT, to the time t futures price, Mt  exp((rf   m)  ). rf is the
risk-free rate, m the market dividend yield, and  the time to maturity. In our empirical calibration,
17we set  = 5 years, matching the maturity of the Dow Jones North American Investment Grade Index,
rf = 2:5% and m = 1:5%.
We also need a set of state prices that prevail following a crash of size, x. Since state prices are
parameterized by the level of market volatility, m(x), this requires taking a stand on the post-crash
level of option-implied volatilities. To maintain parsimony we assume that option-implied volatilities
exhibit a constant elasticity relative to the log index return (crash), such that the post-crash volatility
is given by:
m(x) = m(x = 0)  exp(  log(1   x)) (30)
Since the bonds and tranches we examine have maturities of approximately ve years, we are interested
in estimates of the elasticity, ^ , of the ve-year option-implied volatilities, rather than a short-dated
measure of implied volatility, such as the CBOE VIX index. Using weekly data from January 2003
through June 2009, we estimate the elasticity of the 5-year at-the-money option implied volatility to be -
0.37 (t-stat: -7.63). By comparison, the elasticity of the VIX index { which is based on short-dated equity
index options { is -2.86 (t-stat: -17.61).6 In the empirical applications we set the elasticity parameter,
, equal to -0.40, and m(x = 0) equal to the ve year option-implied volatility corresponding to each
day. Whenever objective measures of long-dated volatility are required, we scale the option-implied
volatilities by 80% to remove the eect of the volatility risk premium.
3.2.2 State-contingent payos
To derive state-contingent asset payos, as a function of the aggregate equity index level, we modify
Merton's (1974) structural model of credit to include a common factor driving asset returns of various
rms. Each rm is assumed to be characterized by a triple of parameters: the asset beta (a), the
debt-to-asset ratio (D
A), and idiosyncratic asset volatility (e). The state-contingent default probabilities
and expected payos can then be expressed as a function of the (log) terminal moneyness, m. With
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6Elasticity estimates based on daily data are -0.29 (t-stat: -14.84) for the ve-year option implied volatility, and -3.23









Conditional on default the terminal asset value { on which the bond recovery is based { can be derived
as a function of the terminal moneyness, m:
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It is common to assume that a fraction, , of the terminal asset value is lost to bankruptcy costs (Leland
(1994)). For example, in order to t the data, Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2009) need bankruptcy
costs to be approximately equal to 50% of the terminal asset value. Finally, we can write the expected
state-contingent payo for an individual bond as:
PBond(m) = 1  
0
@1  
(1   )  Et
h




A  pD(m) (34)
Tranches are derivative claims, whose payos derive from the value of of the underlying bond portfolio.
A tranche is characterized by two attachments points, [X;Y ]. The lower attachment, X, point denes the
largest portfolio loss that will not impair the tranche payo; the upper attachment point, Y , describes the
portfolios loss at which the tranche value is completely wiped out. In order to derive the state-contingent
tranche payos we will make a convenient simplication and assume that the underlying portfolio is
innitely diversied (N ! 1), and comprised of identical bonds. The large, homogenous portfolio
(LHP) assumption implies that the bond portfolio payo converges in probability to the expression
derived above, and the tranche payo can be obtained by simply applying the contractual tranche terms
to (34):
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(35)
In our empirical analysis we focus on two assets: AA-rated corporate bonds { the highest rated
class on bonds for which there is a reliably broad cross-section of data available { and a [7;10] tranche
referencing the Dow Jones North America Investment Grade index (CDX.NA.IG). The CDX.NA.IG
index is comprised of the debt of 125 issuers with an average rating between BBB+ and A-, such that
only suciently senior tranches are expected to garner high credit ratings. Finally, rather than calibrate
19new model parameter values for both securities on each day we will use the time-series means reported
in Table VI of Coval, Jurek, and Staord (2009a). In particular, we x the parameters for a typical
AA-rated bond at a = 0:85, D
A = 0:19, and e = 0:31; and for the \average" security in the CDX.NA.IG
index at { a = 0:74, D
A = 0:34, and e = 0:27.
To compute the state-contingent bond and tranche payo functions following a crash of magnitude x,
we proceed as follows: (1) update the level of aggregate market volatility by using the constant elasticity
of volatility specication described earlier; (2) scale the idiosyncratic volatility estimate, e, by the ratio
of the post-crash market volatility, m(x), to the baseline volatility (0.15), in order to ensure that asset






 exp( a  log(1   x)) (36)
The updated state contingent asset payos, Pi(m;x), are then obtained by applying the formulas, (34)
and (35), and valuation is completed using the post-crash state prices, A(m;x).
3.2.3 Calibration results
In early 2007, the credit spreads on AAA-rated corporate bonds and the [7, 10] tranche of the CDX.IG
were nearly the same. While not formally rated, the [7, 10] tranche was considered by practitioners to be
the junior most CDX tranche that would be rated AAA. The similar ratings imply that the unconditional
expected losses for these two securities are essentially the same. However, the state-contingent payo
functions for similarly-rated bonds and tranches can be quite dierent. Panel A of Figure 7 displays
the calibrated state-contingent payo functions for a corporate bond that was rated AA and the [7,
10] tranche of the CDX.NA.IG. The primary way in which these securities dier is that the tranche
concentrates its losses in worse economic states. A consequence of this state-contingent prole is that
the drop in expected payo as economic conditions deteriorate is steeper and approaches with a smaller
shock. Therefore, the quality of the tranche as collateral against crashes is inferior to that of the bond.
For example, holding the haircut constant, the crash size that exhausts the collateral is always smaller
for this tranche than for the bond. Similarly, the necessary haircut for the lender to be protected against
a crash of size x is always larger for this tranche than for the bond, as illustrated in Panel B of Figure 7.
The dierent crash exposures between these two similarly-rated securities suggest that the proper
schedules of collateral haircuts/nancing spreads should be dierent. These dierences should be espe-
cially acute when nancing spreads are very low or when haircuts are very low. Panel C of Figure 7 plots
the proper nancing spread as a function of collateral haircut for the bond and tranche. With relatively
20high collateral levels, the margin loans supporting both the bond and tranche are close to riskfree, com-
manding negligible nancing spreads. Even with very low collateral levels, the margin loan supporting
the bond is nearly riskfree. However, the margin loan supporting the tranche becomes considerably more
risky at low collateral haircuts and should command a noticably higher nancing spread.
To the extent that the nancing spreads for tranches are set based on the proper spreads for similarly-
rated bonds (i.e. much too low when haircuts are small) the investor in the tranche receives a highly
valuable nancing benet. As we did earlier, we calculate the borrower's nancing alpha as the dierence
between the borrower's expected return under the lender's imperfect nancing rule and the proper cost
of capital. The lender's rule of thumb rule is to charge a single nancing spread to both bond and
tranche investors based on the proper nancing spread for a bond with a haircut of 10%. Panel D in
Figure 7 shows the magnitude of the borrower's nancing alpha as a function of collateral. For very low
collateral haircuts, the borrower's expected return due to this nancing benet becomes enormous.
4 Model Implications
The contribution of this paper is to highlight how dierences in systematic risk exposures and vari-
ation in the aggregate quantity of risk, can combine to produce extreme changes in the crash risk cost
of capital for a variety of common security types, and consequently to spreads and haircuts associated
with collateralized loans against these securities. These eects manifest themselves even in the absence
of asymmetric information, liquidity costs, agency concerns, or time-varying risk aversion.
Within our framework, every nancing contract is characterized by a haircut, H, and a fee, l (or
interest rate) that has to be remitted to the lender in order to compensate him for bearing losses in
excess of the haircut. As the haircut is varied, the lending rate (or spread over the riskfree rate) adjusts
to reect dierences in risk-sharing, producing a schedule of haircut-spread pairs between which the
agents are indierent at initiation of the loan. As the aggregate quantity of risk { the state variable {
changes over time, this nancing agreement has to be renegotiated. In nancial markets, renegotiation
can be accomplished relatively easily, as most collateralized lending is overnight. Although borrowers can
select from a continuum of new haircut-spread pairs, in practice, there seems to be signicant interest in
contracts that do not require signicant ex post adjustments to the nancing terms as market conditions
change. For example, Gorton and Metrick (2009) interpret the large rise in haircuts for structured
securities during the 2007-2008 credit crisis as a panicked \run on repo," suggesting that haircut stability
is of central importance to market practitioners. This raises the question of what constitutes \good"
collateral, and what is necessary to ensure the stability of spreads and haircuts?
214.1 Stress tests
Our analytical framework enables us to explore how the nancing terms for various types of securities
are expected to adjust in response to changes in the level of the state variables controlling the distribution
of aggregate jump sizes and their pricing. In the model, these variables are the aggregate volatility and
risk aversion (assumed to be constant). We consider two polar \stress test" scenarios: in the rst, the
haircut is held xed, and the spread is allowed to vary; in the second, the spread is held xed, and the
haircut adjusts. To the extent that market participants wish to keep spreads low and stable, this exercise
can be used to pin down the minimal necessary haircut (e.g. to keep spreads below 50bps across the
desired state variable range).
The simplest conceivable nancing arrangement occurs when the maximum crash size is bounded at
x. If the haircut is xed at any value greater than or equal to B(x), the lender's sensitivity is equal to
zero (i.e. he bears no risk). Portfolio margin or risk-based margin rules can be viewed as operating in this
way. For example, under portfolio margining the required haircut is assigned to all assets within a class
based on the losses expected in the event of an underlying price move of y%, where y is determined
based on the maximum of an absolute return shock and the return associated with some critical Z-score
value.7 More generally, when the crash magnitude is not bounded, the lender is exposed to the risk of
loss, for which he charges a spread depending on the posted haircut.
In Figure 8 we report the results of a stress test conducted on the AA-rated bond and the [7, 10]
CDX.NA.IG tranche described earlier, as well as for a hypothetical [7, 100] CDX.NA.IG tranche. The
rst row of the gure plots the proper nancing spreads at three dierent haircut levels, while the second
row shows the proper haircuts at three dierent nancing spreads, all as a function of current annualized
stock market volatility. There are two important messages from this analysis. First, the bond represents
good collateral, while the equivalently rated [7, 10] tranche does not. In fact, the [7, 10] tranche is
expected to require a 100% haircut when volatility exceeds approximately 40%. Second, the hypothetical
[7, 100] CDX.NA.IG tranche would be good collateral.
The analysis also highlights that reliance on credit ratings as a basis for collateral haircuts is prob-
lematic, if it is desirable to have stable spreads across economic conditions. While both of the securities
in the previous analysis would have ex ante received a rating of AA, they exhibit very dierent nancing
term dynamics. Credit ratings encourage simplied imperfect collateral haircut/spread schedules that
are likely to implicitly assume that all securities within a rating category share similar crash exposures.
7This approach parallels the intuition of portfolio value-at-risk computations. For example, under a Gaussian distribu-
tion, the 99.99% VaR corresponds to a critical Z-score value of -3.72. For index options, typical broker rules are based on
the maximum of an underlying price move y of +6%/-8%, and the return implied by a critical Z-score value of -5.
22As emphasized by Coval, Jurek, and Staord (2009b), credit ratings do not focus on state-contingent
risk proles. As we demonstrated above, the expected recovery value conditional on a market crash can
be highly time varying and meaningfully dierent across similarly-rated securities.
4.2 Financing terms during the credit crisis
Gorton and Metrick (2009) report some statistics on average repo rates and haircuts for a wide range
of securities throughout the nancial crisis applicable for broker-dealers. Despite their name, the broker-
dealers were functionally the investors in these securities who largely nanced themselves in the repo
market. Table 2 compares the repo spreads and haircuts for AAA-rated CDOs and corporate bonds,
as reported in Gorton and Metrick (2009), to our model-implied funding schedule. In the rst-half of
2007, AAA-rated CDO tranches had a collateral haircut of 0% and a nancing spread of 7 bps. This
is clearly inconsistent with the model. With no haircut, the nancier is bearing the crash risk and
should be collecting the full crash risk premium. For many highly-rated CDO tranches, the unlevered
annualized crash risk premium was large. For instance, according to this analysis the [7, 10] CDX.NA.IG
tranche should have earned an average crash risk premium of 82 bps over the rst half of 2007. The repo
market's funding schedule in the pre-crisis period helps reconcile the view that some of the highly-rated
CDO tranches were simultaneously overvalued and kept on the balance sheets of the broker-dealers. The
transaction alpha of selling the overpriced securities was considerably smaller than the nancing alpha
available by holding on to them.
In the second half of 2007, collateral haircuts on AAA-rated CDO tranches averaged 8.3% and the
associated nancing spreads averaged 108 bps, according to Gorton and Metrick (2009). In 2008, hair-
cuts for these securities averaged 53.5% with average nancing spreads of 232 bps. The large increases in
haircuts and nancing spreads suggest that the eective nancing rule used in repo markets is a function
of market volatility, consistent with the predictions of our framework. We can illustrate how the signif-
icant increase in volatility over this period translates into model-implied haircuts/spreads for the bond
and tranche described earlier. Specically, we construct a proper schedule of collateral haircuts/margin
loan spreads as a function of volatility (0.8 x VIX). In Figure 9, we plot the time series of the minimum
required haircuts for the bond and tranche from 2007 through 2009 for a lender charging a constant
nancing spread of either 25 bps or 250 bps. With a nancing spread of 25 bps, the proper haircut for
the bond never exceeds 20%, while the proper haircut for the tranche rises from an initial level near
zero, peaking over 100% at the height of the crisis.
234.3 Robust repo collateral
We can develop intuition for the safety of a collateralized loan from the approximation of the lender's
dollar charge (11). This formula highlights that the slope of the crash consequence function around
the index level at which the lender sustains losses, ^ x, plays a key role in determining the level { and
dynamics through time varying volatility { of borrowing rates. For equities, this slope can be linked
to equity betas, which typically range between 0 and 2; although in principle, stocks with higher betas
could be created. For credit instruments, the market practice has been to link this exposure to credit
ratings. However, as demonstrated in Coval, Jurek, and Staord (2009a) the systematic risk proles
of similarly-rated securities can be quite dierent. Unlike highly-rated corporate bonds, for which the
sensitivity, B0(^ x), is modest due to the the typically high recovery values, the slope can be very large
for many types of structured nance securities. Figure 10 plots the crash sizes at which haircuts are
exhausted (^ x) for the tranches of the CDX.NA.IG that were considered equivalent to being AAA-rated.
Only the [30, 100] tranche has lower crash exposure than the underlying asset pool. With small haircuts,
the mezzanine tranches shift much of the crash risk onto the lender. This translates into dramatically
dierent spread/haircut dynamics when these securities are used as collateral.
Figure 10 also plots the crash sizes at which haircuts are exhausted for various hypothetical senior
tranches. All of these represent good collateral. Because, in practice, many tranches were constructed
to be relatively thin (e.g. [7, 10] instead of [7, 100]), the rate at which the lender incurs losses after the
borrower haircut is exhausted is extremely fast. Put dierently, in order to ensure stable spreads when
these types of structured securities are used as collateral, haircuts must be signicantly larger than for
identically rated bonds. Another alternative is to make tranches wider to ensure that the rate at which
the lender's loss given default grows with the crash size is mitigated.
Most of the securities for which large swing in haircuts were observed during the credit crisis of
2007-2008 { AAA RMBS/CMBS, subprime MBS, CLOs, and CDOs { have crash consequence functions
that are very steep around modest crashes, i.e. low recovery values in the event of a crash. As such, the
large increase in haircuts is not surprising when viewed from the perspective of our framework, given
the large concurrent increases in equity market volatility. In particular, we have shown that highly-
rated mezzanine tranches of a CDO consisting of investment grade corporate bonds are poor collateral,
because there is a real chance they will lose all of their value in a crash. Resecuritizing these tranches in
a second-generation CDO does not resolve this issue; a super-senior [30, 100] tranche of a re-securitized
pool of [7, 10] mezzanine tranches on investment grade corporate bonds, would be poor collateral for the
same reason. However, the stability of spreads/haircuts can be increased considerably by increasing the
24tranche width. A [7, 100] tranche could in fact be nanced with a stable haircut and spread during this
period, precisely because its recovery value in the event of a crash remains high.
It is generally hard to nd corporate bonds with very low expected recovery values and a high
probability of default. If these were to exist, they would likely have a systematic risk prole somewhat
similar to a mezzanine CDO tranche, where a modest economic downturn eliminates their entire value.
Even a super-senior tranche of a CDO with these types of bonds would represent poor collateral as the
entire asset pool can go to zero. While corporate bonds of this type do not exist, subprime mortgages
share many of these qualities. Highly levered home borrowing, limited prospects of paying o the
loan without continued house price appreciation, and generally large costs associated with liquidating
real estate collateral, combine to produce rapidly declining values as a function of aggregate economic
conditions. Moreover, since these loans tended to be issued in areas with relatively high price-to-rent
ratios, convergence to average price-to-rent ratios would further adversely aect the recovery value
in default (Las Vegas, Florida, and California). As a result, subprime mortgages exhibit the central
feature of unstable collateral { a steeply sloped crash consequence function even in the vicinity of small
economic shocks. Securitizations of these products (e.g. RMBS, or CDOs of subprime RMBS) inherit
these systematic risk proles, and would also be expected to constitute unstable collateral.
4.4 State-contingent adverse selection
The striking change in repo market nancing terms over the course of the credit crisis has been
attributed to an increase in the \information sensitivity" of the collateral - typically debt instruments -
which spurred concerns about adverse selection (Holmstr om (2008), Gorton and Metrick (2009), Dang,
Holmstr om, and Gorton (2010)). These authors argue that following the initial deterioration in macroe-
conomic conditions, an increased incentive to produce information led to a large decline in trade, or a \run
on repo." This interpretation is based on the premise that the majority of the relevant state-contingent
uncertainty is idiosyncratic, and in such a setting, information asymmetry creates the potential for ad-
verse selection. However, the focus on idiosyncratic risks is more appropriate in a rm-level security
analysis, rather than for the diversied pools of assets (ABX, CDX), and derivatives thereon (CDO,
CDO-squared), that were at the center of the crisis. In the limit of complete diversication (e.g. an
index), there is no value to private information gathering and adverse selection plays no role (Sub-
rahmanyam (1991), Gorton and Pennacchi (1993)). In this case, the only remaining component is the
state-contingent mean payo prole of the asset class (Figure 7; top left panel), reecting its fundamental
(or systematic) risk exposure. Without explicitly accounting for the systematic risk exposures of these
25securities, claims about the relevance of state-contingent adverse selection are dicult to interpret, and
map into actual circumstances.
The analysis in this paper suggests that the highly non-linear systematic risk exposures, especially for
highly-rated mezzanine CDO tranches, can account for the dynamics of repo market haircuts, even in the
absence of any frictions. To the extent that additional asymmetric information concerns were present,
it is useful to distinguish whether they were related to idiosyncratic or systematic payo uncertainties.
Traditionally, the domain of adverse selection is asymmetric information over idiosyncratic risks. Asym-
metric information over systematic risk exposures is better described as an investor mistake (Gennaioli,
Shleifer, and Vishny (2010)), or perhaps, ignorance. For example, Coval, Jurek, and Staord (2009a,b)
present evidence consistent with the observation that investors did not fully appreciate the nature of the
underlying systematic risks in structured securities and the extreme sensitivity of CDO-squared struc-
tures to small changes in the underlying asset pool that the second generation CDO was referencing.
As a result of the repricing that took place during the credit crisis, many of these investors may well
have recognized their error and stepped away from trading in these securities. However, this represents
a channel distinct from the state-contingent adverse selection mechanism implicit in the claims of a \run
on repo."
Our analysis begins with the notion that the securities used as collateral are priced correctly. An
alternative view is that some structured securities were mispriced ex ante. Because mezzanine CDO
tranches are highly-levered derivatives, they create a powerful incentive to become informed about the
assets in the underlying portfolio. If one suspected that the underlying assets were signicantly mispriced,
tranches referencing this pool would inherit this mispricing, and be prone to extreme revaluations due to
their built-in leverage. For example, suppose an asset pool was priced at par, but had a true value of only
75% of par. The most junior 25% of any CDO referencing that pool would be worthless ex ante. Moreover,
the entire capital structure of a second-generation CDO built around tranches of the bottom 25% of the
initial CDO would also be worthless ex ante. An investor with private information about the value of the
collateral pool who sold the [7, 10] tranche (or any tranche of the CDO-squared), would be guaranteed
a risk-free return. In this situation, there is no role whatsoever for state-contingent adverse selection in
the subsequent revaluation of the mezzanine CDO tranche. This tranche was \informationally-sensitive"
prior to any deterioration in economic conditions. In practice, the introduction of standardized, liquid
structured products like the ABX indices likely contributed to the process of price discovery, by allowing
investors to reassess their information relative to the market. Although this contributed to improved
investor understanding of valuations of the underlying asset pools, and lead to a rapid revaluation at
26the asset class level, it had little to do with investor concerns about increased idiosyncratic risks.
The state-contingent adverse selection channel for price determination may well be important, but its
signicance in explaining the large price drops and revisions in repo market nancing terms is likely to be
diminished after explicitly accounting for the highly non-linear systematic risk-exposures of structured
securities.
4.5 The failure of linear inutition
The rapid revaluation of structured securities, and their associated repo nancing terms, during the
fall of 2008, caught many market participants and regulators by surprise. This reaction is consistent
with an application of intuition based on linear risk models to the evaluation of non-linear securities.
To illustrate this point we examine the corporate bond and tranche from the perspective of an investor
using a linear, market factor model to project the state-contingent value of the asset.
Specically, suppose that market participants' expectations about future state-contingent valuations
were formed by extrapolating the consequence of market declines using a pre-crisis estimate of asset
market betas. This simple intuition would be suggested, for example, by the equity consequence function,
(20), in which the log asset return is linearly related to the log market return. Under model valuations,
the pre-crisis estimates of the market betas for the corporate bond and senior tranche would have been
0.04 and 0.45, respectively. The top panels in Figure 11 contrast the state-contingent valuations for the
AA corporate bond and the [7;10] tranche that emerge from the naive extrapolation, with the values
obtained from the structural valuation model, as a function of the realized equity index return. To
the extent that market prices correspond to the model, the dierences between the state-contingent
valuations capture the \surprise" of the market participant using the linear model. With the market
index down 40%, the user of the naive model is only slightly surprised by the price of the AA bond, but
hugely surprised by the price of the [7, 10] tranche. While the price of the corporate bond drops 5%
vis-a-vis an expectation of a price drop of 2%, the tranche price falls by 54%, relative to an expected
decline of only 24%. Furthermore, to the extent that market participants expected the tranche to behave
like the rating-matched corporate bond { i.e. move with a market beta of 0.04 { the magnitude of the
surprise would have been even greater.
The bottom panels in Figure 11 plot the state-contingent betas of the bond and tranche under both
the naive and structural models. Unlike for the corporate bond, the magnitude of the market beta of
the senior tranche changes rapidly as a function of the market index return, highlighting the large errors
that will result from value extrapolation based on a constant, pre-crisis beta. In particular, the tranche
27beta increases by a factor of ten from 0.45 to 4.5, when the market index drops 40%.
Reliance on a linear risk model for nonlinear securities will be costly when a bank (or repo market
borrower) chooses short-term nancing over longer-term nancing because they ex ante underestimate
their funding needs following a large systematic shock. In this situation, not only does the value of the
collateral fall more than was expected, but the subsequent nancing terms will involve larger spreads
and/or haircuts to reect the increased systematic risk of the asset. To the extent that this error is
common to many market participants, the immediate and large funding shortfall may be disruptive to
the nancial system.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a framework for understanding the contribution of systematic crash risk to the
cost of capital for a variety of dierent types of securities. When investors purchase securities exposed to
crash risk on margin, this risk is shared with the nancing intermediary. We demonstrate that the price
of the intermediary's crash exposure obtained through the nancing arrangement can uctuate wildly as
a function of aggregate volatility, the economic risk prole of the security, and the size of the borrower's
collateral haircut, or margin. Importantly, similarly-rated collateral do not necessarily share the same
schedule of haircuts and nancing spreads, such that if an investor was oered the same funding/leverage
schedule for a range of collateral, potentially large nancing benets would be available.
The simple framework identies mezzanine-like collateral { assets whose value is quickly exhausted
as the consequence of a market crash { as being expected to have especially volatile haircuts/nancing
spreads in the time series. In an economic environment where haircuts/spreads are expected to be stable,
these types of securities represent low quality collateral.
The primary implication of the analysis for securitization is that state-contingent analysis is required
to determine the collateral properties of assets. High recovery values in the event of crash { typical of
investment-grade bond portfolios and thick senior tranches (e.g. [7, 100] on the CDX.IG) { are necessary
for securitized products to represent stable collateral for repo markets. Without these features, haircuts
and spreads are expected to vary widely across market conditions, comoving strongly in the time series
with aggregate volatility. Given the range of observed equity volatility values, haircuts on AAA-rated
mezzanine tranche of CDOs backed by corporate bonds, can range between 0 and 100%, even in the
absence of any market frictions. While the dramatic shifts in collateral haircuts in repo markets during
2007-2008 have been described as a market \panic," our analysis nds those events as largely justied
given the nature of much of the collateral in question.
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31Table I
Calibrated Parameters of the Beta Crash Return Distribution as Volatility Changes.
The empirical Z-scores are ¯rst converted into returns, and then a beta distribution with parameters, (a; b), is
¯tted to the resulting values by minimizing the squared ¯tting error between the empirical and theoretical cumu-
lative distribution functions (CDFs) at the 50th and 95th percentiles. The largest observed Z-score is assumed
to correspond to the 95th percentile of the population crash distribution. VIX percentiles based on data from
January 2003 - June 2009. Jump variance and risk premium computations assume an annualized crash arrival
intensity, ¸P = 0:20, and a coe±cient of relative risk aversion, °, equal to 2.5.
95th-tile Jump Jump Share in Jump Risk
Percentile 0.8 ¢ VIX ^ a ^ b Crash Size Variance Total Variance Premium
1 8.18% 3.82 92.35 7.68% 0.0004 5.89% 0.11%
5 8.79% 3.82 85.85 8.23% 0.0005 5.86% 0.13%
25 10.43% 3.82 72.14 9.69% 0.0006 5.79% 0.18%
50 13.30% 3.82 56.28 12.19% 0.0010 5.67% 0.30%
75 18.51% 3.82 40.07 16.55% 0.0019 5.46% 0.60%
95 36.09% 3.83 19.94 29.73% 0.0063 4.82% 2.59%
99 53.23% 3.84 12.15 40.57% 0.0122 4.30% 6.46%Table II
Comparison of actual and model-implied haircuts for corporate bonds and CDO tranches
(2007:01-2008:12).
This table reports summary statistics for the ¯nancing spreads and repo market haircuts that applied to AA-AAA
rated collateral during 2007-2008. Panel A reports data for CDO tranches backed by corporate bonds; Panel B
reports data for corporate bonds. \Actual" values are from Gorton and Metrick (2009). Model collateral haircut
values { based on the structural valuation framework { are computed for three di®erent ¯nancing spread levels
(25, 75, and 250bps). The model AA-AAA CDO values apply to a [7;10] tranche referencing the CDX.NA.IG
index; all model parameter values are based on data from Coval, Jurek, and Sta®ord (2009a). For each day in the
time series, the market crash distribution is obtained by scaling the empirical distribution by 80% of the CBOE
VIX index. Pre-crash Arrow-Debreu state prices are computed using the 5-year at-the-money option implied
volatility for the S&P 500 index, and assume there is no volatility skew. Negative haircut values indicate the
proposed spread exceeds the risk premium applying to the crash risk exposure of the security.
Panel A: AA-AAA CDO
Actual Model (s = 25bps) Model (s = 75bps) Model (s = 250bps)
s (bps) H H H H
Whole period 130 30.00% 26.69% 20.32% 9.45%
2007 58 4.30% 11.54% 6.87% -2.38%
2008 232 53.50% 41.73% 33.61% 21.18%
2007:01-2007:06 7 0.00% 2.21% -0.27% -8.35%
2007:07-2007:12 108 8.30% 20.64% 13.79% 3.46%
2008:01-2008:06 NA NA 26.44% 18.53% 7.15%
2008:07-2008:12 NA NA 56.67% 48.35% 34.88%
Panel B: AA-AAA Corporates
Actual Model (s = 25bps) Model (s = 75bps) Model (s = 250bps)
s (bps) H H H H
Whole period 78 0.50% 1.14% -1.27% -9.52%
2007 27 0.00% -0.35% -2.49% -10.75%
2008 124 0.90% 2.63% -0.07% -8.29%
2007:01-2007:06 -2 0.00% -0.79% -2.94% -11.23%
2007:07-2007:12 55 0.00% 0.08% -2.06% -10.29%
2008:01-2008:06 - - 0.37% -1.77% -9.97%
2008:07-2008:12 - - 4.83% 1.59% -6.64%Figure 1. Daily Value-Weighted Stock Market Index Returns from CRSP (1926 to 2010). The top
panel plots the time series of daily close-to-close returns on the CRSP value-weighted stock index from 1926:01-
2010:12 (N = 22527). The middle panel plots the annualized standard deviation of index returns computed using
a rolling 3-month window. The bottom panel the value of daily returns after they have been re-scaled by the
one-day-lagged measure of index volatility (Z-scores).
















































eFigure 2. Crash Return Distribution Calibration. This ¯gure illustrates the process of calibrating the
model crash return distribution to the empirical data at two levels of index volatility, ¾t. The empirical Z-scores
are ¯rst converted into returns, and then a beta distribution with parameters, (a; b), is ¯tted to the resulting
values by minimizing the squared ¯tting error between the empirical and theoretical cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) at the 50th and 95th percentiles (top row). The empirical CDF is plotted in blue, and the
¯tted theoretical CDF is plotted in red; the two ¯tting points are highlighted with circles. The corresponding
probability distribution functions (PDFs) for the equity index crash magnitudes are plotted in the bottom row
(solid), along with PDFs based on standard maximum likelihood parameter estimates (dotted).























































FFigure 3. Crash Sizes that Exhaust Collateral Supporting Equities. The left panel plots the critical
value of the index crash size, ^ x, at which the lender becomes exposed to losses as a function of the equity market
beta, ¯, for three haircut levels, H. The right panel examines the comparative statics of ^ x with respect to the
collateral haircut holding equity beta ¯xed.





























































































































Beta = 0.50Figure 4. Cost of Capital for Levered Equity Positions. This ¯gure examines the cost of capital for an
unlevered equity position, and allocates the charge between the borrower (investor) and the lender (intermediary).
The collateral haircut is assumed to be equal, H = 0:25, and the distribution of index losses conditional on a crash
is based on an annualized market volatility of ¾t = 0:15. The top panel plots the expected return to the unlevered
strategy (solid), the borrower (dash dot), and the lender (dotted), as a function of the underlying equity market
beta, ¯. The bottom left panel further decomposes the lender's expected return into the spread charged on the
loan and the expected loss rate due to market crashes, when the haircut is ¯xed at 0.25. The bottom right panel
plots the borrower's expected rate of return stemming from exposure to market crashes. The expected return is
plotted under two ¯nancing rules: the proper rule (examined in the bottom left plot), and a simple rule-of-thumb
where the lender charges a ¯xed rate of 25bps independent of the equity's market beta.
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Rule−of−thumbFigure 5. The E®ect of Collateral on the Equity Cost of Capital. This ¯gure plots the lender spread
as a function of the collateral haircut (inverse of leverage). The right panel plots the proper lender spread for
three equity market beta values. The right panel plots the ¯nancing alpha obtained by the borrower if the
lender were to use a simple rule-of-thumb which ¯xes the loan spread at 25bps independent of the equity beta
or haircut. The ¯nancing alpha is de¯ned as the di®erence between the borrower's expected return under the
lender's rule-of-thumb spread of 25 bps and the proper cost of capital.


















































































Figure 6. E®ect of Volatility on Collateral Haircuts and Spreads on Equity Positions. This ¯gure
examines the schedule of model predicted ¯nancing arrangements { spread / collateral pairs { as a function of
the level of equity market volatility. The left panel ¯xes the collateral haircut at one of three levels (10%, 25%,
or 50%) and forces the lender spread to adjust as volatility changes. The right panel ¯xes the spread at one of
three levels (25, 50, or 100bps), and plots the required collateral haircut, as a function of aggregate volatility.
The equity beta is ¯xed at one (¯ = 1).



































































Spread =  25 bps
Spread =  50 bps
Spread = 100 bpsFigure 7. Cost of Capital for Corporate Bond and CDO Tranche. The top left panel plots the state-
contingent payo® function for a AA-rated corporate bond, and a [7;10] tranche referencing the CDX.NA.IG index.
The top right panel plots the critical value of the index crash size, ^ x, triggering a lender loss, as a function of the
collateral haircut applied to each security. The bottom left panel plots the spread charged by a lender who provides
¯nancing for the purchase of each security, as a function of the collateral haircut. The spread-haircut pairs are set
to re°ect the risk born by the lender in the transaction, creating a continuum of ¯nancing arrangements between
which the market participants are assumed to be indi®erent. The bottom right panel plots the ¯nancing \alpha"
that accrues to the borrower, as a function of the collateral haircut, if the lender uses a simple rule-of-thumb
when setting the ¯nancing terms. The rule assumes that either security can be ¯nanced at the proper rate that
applies to a AA-corporate bond with a 10% collateral haircut.


























































































































































TrancheFigure 8. Security Financing Stress Test. This ¯gure examines the schedule of model predicted ¯nancing
arrangements (spread / collateral pairs) as a function of the level of equity market volatility. The left panel plots
the ¯nancing terms for a AA corporate bond; the center panel { for the [7;10] tranche of the CDX.NA.IG index;
and the right panel { for a hypothetical tranche of the CDX.NA.IG index with attachments points [7; 100]. The
top row ¯xes the collateral haircut at one of three levels (10%, 25%, or 50%), and plots the lender spread, as a
function of aggregate volatility. The bottom row ¯xes the lender spread at one of three levels (25, 75, or 250bps),
and plots the required collateral haircut, as a function of aggregate volatility.










































































































































]Figure 9. Model Implied Collateral Haircut for Corporate Bond and CDO Tranche. This ¯gure
plots the times series of model implied haircuts for a AA-rated corporate bond, and a [7, 10] tranche of the
CDX.NA.IG Index, for two di®erent lender ¯nancing spread levels. For each day in the time series, the market
crash distribution is obtained by scaling the empirical Z-score distribution by 80% of the CBOE VIX index.











































































Volatility (0.8*VIX)Figure 10. Collateral Fragility. This ¯gure plots the critical index crash magnitude, ^ x, at which the
borrower's collateral is eliminated, and the lender begins to sustain a loss, as a function of the haircut. The left
panel plots ^ x for a AA-rated corporate bond, and the mezzanine and senior tranches referencing the CDX.NA.IG
index. The right panel plots ^ x for a AA-rated corporate bond, and hypothetical tranches of the CDX.NA.IG
index with attachments points [X;100].
































































































































[30, 100] TrancheFigure 11. State-contingent Asset Values. The top row plots the change in value of an AA-rated corporate
bond (left panel) and the [7;10] tranche of the CDX.NA.IG (right panel), as a function of the index level. The
value predicted by the structural model is depicted using the solid, blue line; a naive value based on the index
return and a ¯xed, CAPM ¯ estimated locally to at-the-money is depicted using the dashed, red line. The bottom
row plots the state-contingent CAPM ¯ of the two securities as a function of the index level computed within the
structural model (solid blue), and contrasts it with the naive at-the-money estimate (dashed red).
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